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Capital, Non-Capital and Transformative Politics in
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Deepankar Basu ±

December 18, 2018

Abstract
Kalyal Sanayal’s work on postcolonial capitalism has been influential in many strands of
critical social theory. In this brief note, I investigate three key components of his
argument and find them wanting. In particular, I show that the evolution of land
ownership in India does not support the claim that the primitive accumulation of capital
is one of the important processes in operation in contemporary India. On the contrary,
the evidence suggests that the process of primitive accumulation has been arrested or
significantly slowed down. In addition to the critical comments on Sanyal (2007), I
indicate towards an alternative framework that is better able to explain the key features
of contemporary India.
JEL Codes: B24; O290
Keywords: postcolonial capitalism

1 Introduction
In his 2007 book, Rethinking Capitalist Development: Primitive Accumulation, Governmentality
and Post-Colonial Capitalism, Kalyan Sanyal offers an innovative analysis of contemporary
capitalism in the global South. The economy of post-colonial capitalist social formations, Sanyal
argues, is composed of two domains, a domain of capitalist production (which he calls capital)
and a domain of non-capitalist production (which he calls non-capital). It is a key contention of
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Sanyal that the two domains are governed by very different logics: while the former is governed
by the logic of accumulation, the latter is defined by the logic of need.
Capital and non-capital are linked together in a relationship marked by both conflict and
dependence. The development and consolidation of capitalist production (what Sanyal refers to
as the ‘arising’ of capital) involves the primitive accumulation of capital. A sizable section of the
population dispossessed by primitive accumulation is not absorbed in the domain of capitalist
production. Divorced from the means of labour and yet unable to participate in capitalist
production, this dispossessed population is forced to ensure their survival by engaging in petty
production in the ‘informal sector’, a domain of non-capitalist production.
Continued legitimation of the rule of capital in the context of a bourgeois democratic
political set-up requires that this displaced and dispossessed population be attended to; they can
neither be annihilated, nor ignored. The post-colonial State steps in with a panoply of welfarist
policies. The key function of these welfare measures is to reverse the effects of primitive
accumulation by ensuring the flow of resources from the capitalist to the non-capitalist sector. 1
This flow of resources supports the livelihood activities of the population in the informal sector
and ensures the reproduction of non-capital through time.
Sanyal wants to emphasize that his narrative has broken free from all historicist logic that
had infected previous Marxist theorizing of the Third World. Thus, there is no possibility, even
at the level of theory, of understanding post-colonial capitalism in terms of any process of
transition. Neither is there a transition underway from pre-capitalist to capitalist forms of
1

Sanyal (2007) argued that intervention of the State reverses primitive accumulation. In the foreword to the book,
Partha Chatterjee argued that it is the effects of primitive accumulation that are reversed by welfare measures and
not primitive accumulation itself. Chatterjee also indicated that when he had discussed this point with Sanyal, the
latter had agreed with him.
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organization, which might have been arrested for contingent historical factors; nor is there any
hope of envisioning the future as a transition from capitalist to socialist forms of organization.
What Sanyal offers, instead, is a picture of post-colonial capitalism endlessly reproducing the
unity of capital and non-capital, the former undermining but also creating the latter.
In this brief note, I would like to critically engage with Sanyal’s argument, point to some
of its limitations and indicate towards an alternative framework. I would like to start by
acknowledging that there is an undoubted ring of plausibility to Sanyal’s argument. This is
because it purports to explain the key feature of post-capitalism, viz., surplus labour. While
Sanyal’s argument has been endorsed and used by Chatterjee (2008), there are at least three
serious problems that I would like to highlight.
First, it is not clear how important welfare programmes of the State are for the survival of
households in the non-capitalist sector. The non-capitalist sector, i.e., the informal sector, has
been in existence for a much longer time period than any serious welfare programmes of the
State. For instance, existence of the informal sector during the colonial period, if not earlier, has
been noted by many historians (Chandavarkar, 1994). The fact that the informal sector survived
when welfare programmes of the State were small or non-existent suggests that, while welfare
programmes certainly improve the conditions of the working poor, the informal sector can and
does manage to survive in the absence of welfare.
Moreover, it is not at all obvious that there has been a net transfer of resources from the
capitalist to the non-capitalist sector in India. One would need to back up this claim with some
evidence, which Sanyal (2007) does not. What makes this argument suspect, nonetheless, is that
the subsidies given by the State to big capital (in the form of tax breaks, concessional credit, land
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and power at below market prices, and other hidden subsidies) has been much larger than the
subsidies that might benefit the working poor like those that support the public distribution
system, the national rural employment guarantee scheme, the fuel, electricity and fertilizer
subsidy (Sainath, 2013). While the difference between the subsidies to big capital and the
working poor might have been limited in the initial years of independence, it must have certainly
widened after the adoption of neo-liberal policies in the mid-1980s (Basu and Das, 2009). The
fact that total tax collection in India has been, and remains, highly skewed towards indirect taxes,
means that the vast population residing in the non-capitalist sector continue to pay a large share
of the total taxes of the Central and State governments. Juxtaposing these two facts suggests
caution in claiming that there is a net flow of resources from the capitalist to the non-capitalist
sector, mediated by welfare schemes of the State. Thus, Sanyal’s claim that State’s intervention
is the crucial factor that ensures the reproduction of non-capital in post-colonial capitalism is at
best a weak argument – both theoretically and empirically.
Second, Sanyal throws very little light on a crucial part of his argument: why is the
capitalist sector unable to absorb the surplus population even in principle? While it is
undoubtedly true that most countries in the global South today suffer from a declining capacity
of its capitalist sectors to generate adequate employment, there are and have been notable
exceptions in the past. Not only the early industrializers in Europe, and the New World, but also
Japan, and late industrializers like Turkey, South Korea, Taiwan, and to a large extent China,
have managed to absorb significant sections of their surplus agricultural population into the
capitalist sector. While emigration might have played some role in the case of the European
economies, rapid industrialization must have contributed too. Moreover, the latter factor must
have been the more important one in the case of Japan and the late industrializers, and other
4

countries that – like the socialist countries – did not have the option of large scale emigration of
its population. Thus, instead of assuming that the capitalist sector would be unable to absorb the
surplus labour coming from agriculture, as Sanyal (2007) does, it would be theoretically more
productive to understand the concrete reasons that inhibit the capitalist sector’s ability to absorb
labour in countries like India. Sanyal offers no insight in this regard, and that remains a key
shortcoming of his analysis.
The third, and probably the most problematic, aspect of his argument that I would like to
investigate is the claim that the primitive accumulation of capital is a key feature of post-colonial
capitalism. Let us look at this in detail.

2 Primitive Accumulation of Capital
A system of social production organized along capitalist lines can be represented by the circuit of
capital: M-C-C’-M’. The circuit starts with a capitalist firm entering the market with a sum of
money, M, and buying a set of commodities, C. This set consist of two very different
commodities: on the one hand, means of production (raw materials, machines, power, etc.); and
on the other, labour-power (the capacity to work). Once this transaction is completed, the
capitalist leaves the sphere of circulation and moves into the sphere of production. Here the two
commodities are combined, i.e. labour-power is put to work on the means of production to create
the output, C’. Once the new set of commodities has been created, the capitalist returns to the
sphere of circulation and sells them for a sum of money, M’. In normal times, the sum of money
at the end of the circuit, M’, is larger than what the capitalist started out with, M. The difference
between M’ and M is the surplus value appropriated by the capitalist and represents the unpaid
labour time of the workers.
5

Using the circuit of capital to represent the basic structure of capitalist production enables
us to inquire into the three conditions that need to be met to ensure its continued operation. First,
there must be an accumulation of money in the hands of the class of capitalists (the beginning
point of the circuit with M); second, means of production and labour-power must be available for
purchase on the market as commodities (this is needed for the second step of the circuit, M-C);
and finally, there must be a market – the ‘home market’ – for the output of capitalist firms (this
will ensure the completion of the last step of the circuit, C’-M’). The set of historical processes
that created these three conditions is referred to as the primitive accumulation of capital (Marx,
1990, pp. 873-940).
Marx’s description of primitive accumulation in Britain emphasizes that the first
condition was fulfilled by the accumulation of money as usurious and merchant capital through
commercial wars, monopoly trade, the slave trade and open loot and plunder in the colonies
(Marx, 1990, pp. 914-926), that the second condition was met through the brutal expropriation of
the agricultural population through the Enclosure Movement (Marx, 1990, pp. 877-904), and that
the third was satisfied through the destruction of handicraft production in Europe (Marx, 1990,
pp. 908-913). 2

2

With the benefit of hindsight we can say that Marx was too optimistic about the almost automatic growth of the
‘home market’ for the products of capitalist industry. While destruction of handicrafts creates the possibility of the
development of the home market, it is certainly not necessary. The growth of the home market requires the
growth of the incomes of the population that can potentially purchase the products of capitalist industry. If the
population dispossessed by primitive accumulation does not find adequate alternative employment, their incomes
will not grow to the extent necessary to purchase the products of capitalist industry. In fact, the importance of
captive markets in the colonies, especially in India, in providing a stable and growing source of demand for the
products of the emerging British capitalist industry cannot be exaggerated (Davis, 2002). Socialist and radical
nationalist movements in the post-War period recognized this point and emphasized that, since it was neither
possible nor desirable to rely on captive colonial markets as a source of demand, an alternative strategy of
economic development needs to be based on the extension of the home market through radical land reforms and
the concomitant growth of incomes of the majority of the agricultural population.
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While Marx noted that all the three conditions together comprise the primitive
accumulation of capital, he also emphasized that the ‘expropriation of the agricultural producer,
of the peasant from the soil, is the basis of the whole process ’. The expropriation of the
agricultural producer means the forcible separation of the peasant from agricultural land, the
replacement of numerous owners of small holdings with a few large landowners. If this were to
occur on a large scale, as is implicitly assumed by Sanyal (2007), it would lead to a massive
concentration in the ownership of agricultural land, reflected in growth of average area owned,
and share of total land owned, by (the non-expropriated) households. 3 Do we have evidence of
such a process happening in post-colonial India?
The facts about the evolution of land ownership in India, summarized in Table 1, point in
exactly the opposite direction. Between 1961 and 2013, the average area owned per household
has declined continuously, falling from 1.78 hectares in 1961 to 0.59 hectares in 2013, a decline
of 66 percent. The share of land owned by large landowners, i.e. those owning more than 25
acres of land, declined from 28.25 per cent to 5.81 per cent of total agricultural land. At the other
end of the distribution, the share of land owned by marginal and small landowners, i.e. those
owning less than 5 acres of land, increased from 20 per cent to 43.40 per cent of total
agricultural land. Thus, evolution of the patterns of landownership runs counter to the claim that
primitive accumulation of capital, the basis of which is the expropriation of the agricultural
producer, has been an important process in post-colonial India. 4 In fact the evidence suggests

3

In Britain, the expropriation of the agricultural population happened over a period of several centuries. From the
th
th
th
14 to the 17 centuries, arable land was converted to pasture for grazing sheep; during the 18 century, the
th
th
fenland commons were drained; during the mid-18 to the mid-19 century, the Parliamentary Enclosures
converted common land to enclosed, private land. During the colonial and post-colonial period in India, various
processes that have led to loss of access to common lands by the peasantry have been in operation (Davis, 2002).
4
The reduction in the total area from over 128 million hectares to just over 92 million hectares has, probably,
largely been driven by urbanization. The large decline (of about 15 million hectares) witnessed between 2003 and
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exactly the opposite: primitive accumulation, or any other related process, has not been able to
separate peasants from their land on a large scale. Hence, while there is evidence for limited land
concentration in some states like Punjab and Haryana, it seems that primitive accumulation of
capital is not a useful concept for understanding the political economy of contemporary India at
the aggregate level. 5
Table 1: Patterns of Land Ownership in Rural India
Share of Households (%)

1961
1971
1982
1992
2003
2013

Marginal
66.06
62.62
66.64
71.88
79.60
82.83

Small
9.16
15.49
14.70
13.42
10.80
10.00

SemiMedium
12.86
11.94
10.78
9.28
6.00
5.01

Medium
9.07
7.83
6.45
4.54
3.00
1.93

Large
2.85
2.12
1.42
0.88
0.60
0.24

Share of Area Owned (%)

1961
1971
1982
1992
2003
2013

Marginal
7.59
9.76
12.22
16.93
23.05
29.76

Small
12.39
14.68
16.49
18.59
20.38
23.54

SemiMedium
20.54
21.92
23.58
24.58
21.98
22.07

Medium
31.23
30.73
29.83
26.07
23.08
18.83

Large
28.25
22.91
18.07
13.83
11.55
5.81

Total area
owned
(000 ha)
128734
119636
119736
117354
107228
92369

Average area
owned per
household (ha)
1.78
1.53
1.28
1.01
0.73
0.59

Sources: (1) Basole and Basu, 2011a; (2) NSSO, 2014; (3) NSSO, 2004. Marginal: less than 1 ha; Small:
between 1 and 2 ha; Semi-Medium: between 2 and 4 ha; Medium: between 4 and 10 ha; Large: over 10
ha.

2013 is probably partly accounted for by the taking over of agricultural land by industry. To the extent that this was
accomplished with the use of force, it would be part of primitive accumulation of capital.
5
Sanyal (2007) does not distinguish between impoverishment caused by primitive accumulation and that caused
by the general accumulation of capital, a process described by Marx in great detail in chapter 25 of Volume I of
Capital (Marx, 1990). The key difference between the two is that, while the latter is caused by the operation of
economic processes, the former is caused by the use of extra-economic coercion. The fact that impoverishment
has occurred in countries like India does not imply that it was caused by primitive accumulation. It is possible that
the impoverishment was caused by the operation of economic forces like centralization of capital (in the domain of
non-agricultural production) and declining productivity (in the domain of agricultural production).
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3 An Alternative Framework
In this section, I present a brief outline of an alternative perspective, which, to my mind, is a
more fruitful way of approaching the political economy of contemporary India. 6 This alternative
framework starts, just like Sanyal’s, from the recognition that the contemporary Indian economy
is composed of two sectors: a capitalist sector and a non-capitalist sector (which we will call the
informal sector). While we agree with Sanyal that the capitalist sector is governed by the logic of
capital accumulation, we have a different understanding of the dynamics of the informal sector
(what Sanyal calls non-capital).
To grasp its dynamics, we think it is useful to distinguish between two components of the
informal sector: (a) agriculture, which is dominated by small scale production, and (b) the nonagricultural informal sector, which is dominated by small manufacturing or service-sector firms
that mostly use own or family labour. This distinction within the informal sector is useful
because it allows us to understand reasons for its reproduction over time without having to rely
on primitive accumulation of capital or doles from the State.

3.1 The Paradox
We start in the agriculture sector and try to understand the reasons behind the persistence of
small scale agricultural production and the concomitant lack of land concentration. Let us recall
that by the process of concentration is meant the transfer of land from smaller to larger
landholders. A smallholding owner of land can give up his/her ownership to the larger
landholder in at least two different ways, through forcible dispossession (primitive accumulation)
or through sale. In India, both historically and today, the first form of land transfer – so
important, for instance, in the development of capitalist agriculture in England – has not been

6

This section draws on on-going work that I have been doing with Amit Basole, and on Basole and Basu (2011b).

9

observed on any substantial scale. The recent attempts by the State to forcibly drive off peasants
from their land have been fiercely resisted all across India. Singur, Nandigram and the POSCO
villages are well-known examples. Similarly, the armed Maoist insurgency in East-Central India
has been fighting attempts by the State to forcibly clear tribal villages for mining companies
(Basu and Das, 2013).
While forcible eviction of the peasantry, at least on a large scale, has been absent, sale of
land by smallholders has not been observed on a large scale in the post-1947 period either. Rural
land markets seem to be notoriously thin. The refusal of smallholders to part with their land
works against the movement towards land concentration. This refusal, on the face of it, presents
a paradox because it is clear that incomes generated in small-scale farms are insufficient to meet
subsistence needs of the peasant family. Income data presented in Basole and Basu (2011a) show
that agricultural families, other than those with large landholdings (i.e. ownership holdings of 10
acres or more), cannot generate sufficient income from agricultural production to cover their
consumption expenditures. In the domain of production, cost of inputs has increased at a faster
pace than output prices, driven by at least two related factors. First, input subsidies provided by
the State (relating to electricity, water, fertilizers, and seeds) have been gradually withdrawn
since the early 1990s. This has increased the private cost of cultivation. Second, declining public
investment in agriculture has reduced productivity growth. This has led to reduction in output
growth. The two factors have combined to reduce the growth of agricultural incomes, and make
most small scale agricultural plots economically unviable.

3.2 Informal Employment
What could explain this seeming paradox of farmers holding on to unviable plots of land? In
part, the answer must surely be that giving up ownership of the small plot of land would mean a
10

further worsening of the material conditions of their existence compared to their current
situation. To see why this might be so let us recall that to cover the deficit of agricultural
incomes from small-scale farms over subsistence needs, some (or all) family members need to
look for extra sources of income. But wage employment in agriculture has been stagnant due to a
limited capitalist sector and slackening of overall agricultural growth (due to declining public
investment, as we have noted earlier). Hence, the search for extra sources of income often takes
the peasant to the non-farm sector.
Employment in the non-farm sector of the Indian economy can be categorized into four
groups: (1) formal employment in the formal sector, (2) informal employment in the formal
sector, (3) formal employment in the informal sector, and (4) informal employment in the
informal sector. The vast majority of the Indian work force, by some estimates as large as 86
percent, falls into category (4). Moreover, all the growth over the past decades has been in that
category (NCEUS, 2009).
What is available, then, to the peasant-worker in search of non-farm sources of income is
informal urban employment, either employment in the informal sector or informal employment
in the formal sector. As the Sengupta Commission Reports (NCEUS 2007, 2009) have made
amply clear, employment in India’s informal economy is marked by low wages (and income),
abysmal conditions of work, self-exploitation, no social security, and no job security. Thus
informal employment is marked by both lower income (wages for the employed and income for
the self-employed) than formal employment and a higher degree of income uncertainty (i.e., the
probability of finding regular employment on an on-going basis is significantly lower than
unity). Moreover, wages in the non-farm informal sector are determined by income-sharing and
not the marginal product of labour (Fields, 2004). Thus, when more peasant-workers enter
11

informal employment, average incomes for all informal workers fall. Taken together, this means
that expected income (i.e., the product of the probability of employment and the income from
employment) in informal employment is not only lower than the wage rate associated with
formal non-farm employment but also lower than the wage rate in agriculture.
In such a scenario, land ownership acquires a special significance as insurance against
labor market risk. A small piece of land can very well mean assurance of some subsistence needs
in the face of extreme income uncertainty and volatility of food (and other essential
commodities’) prices. Further, drawing on Das (2007), we can argue that a low expected income
from informal non-farm employment leads a peasant-worker family to put in more labour on its
own small-scale farm than a capitalist would employ. This will imply that the notional
agricultural surplus of the peasant-worker family is larger than what a capitalist farmer can
expect to make when she pays the going market wage rate. Thus, the price demanded for a plot
of land by the peasant-worker family (which is a discounted sum of the stream of notional
surpluses of the peasant-worker family) will exceed the price that a capitalist would be willing to
pay (which is a discounted sum of the stream of expected surpluses of the capitalist farmer).
Thus, a transaction (involving land) between the capitalist farmer and the peasant-worker family
will not take place. This means that the peasant-worker family will continue to own the small
piece of land, and that agricultural production will be characterized by the preponderance of
small-scale family farms.
The growth of the informal sector, therefore, feeds on and reinforces the lack of land
concentration. Fragmentation of land holdings and the resulting stagnation in agriculture will
force the peasant-worker family to come looking for non-farm employment. Since formal
employment is not available, they will join the pool of informal workers, keeping informal
12

incomes low (due to income-sharing). Lower incomes and higher precariousness of income
flows keeps peasant families from selling their small plot of land, which maintains or even
increases fragmentation, closing the vicious circle of small-scale family farms and informal
employment.

3.3 Closing the Loop: Restricted Home Market
In the above analysis, the lack of growth of secure, formal sector employment plays an important
role in reinforcing the vicious cycle between small-holding agriculture and the informal sector.
What reasons could explain the virtual stagnation of formal employment in the organized sector?
To answer this question, one needs to start by recognizing that the organized sector has grown
rapidly in terms of output. The fact that output growth has been accompanied by virtual
stagnation of employment points to the rapid growth in productivity (i.e., output per worker).
Hence, the reason for employment stagnation can be understood if the causes of rapid
productivity growth are grasped. Productivity growth in the organized sector has been the result
of an increase in capital intensity, led by rapid mechanization. Thus, the question of employment
stagnation boils down to understanding the reasons behind the growth of capital intensity in the
organized sector.
Two sets of factors have been found to be important in explaining the high capital
intensity of production in the organized sector, especially industry. First, relative cheapening of
capital vis-à-vis labour, since the early 1990s, caused by trade policy changes (opening up the
economy for the import of intermediate and capital goods), and various fiscal and monetary
policies (like capital investment subsidy, interest subsidy, export promotion capital goods
scheme, etc.); and second, the skewed nature of demand – lot of it debt financed – that has been
propelling growth in the recent past.
13

This latter factor ties in with the argument that we have been developing in this paper.
The vicious circle of linkages between small-holder agriculture and informal employment
implies lack of income growth for the vast majority of the workforce (in agriculture and the
informal sector), which means lack of a broad-based “home market” for output produced in the
organized sector. A large part of aggregate demand comes from the export sector or from the
expenditures of households at the top of the income distribution. Both these sources of demand
entail demand for commodities (like automobiles) that are produced in relatively capitalintensive industries (ILO, 2009; Kannan and Raveendran, 2009; NCEUS, 2007; NCEUS, 2009).
Thus, a skewed source of aggregate demand, in addition to misplaced policy priorities (relating
to fiscal, monetary, trade and industrial policies), encourages a relatively capital intensive
production, which, in turn, implies stagnation of employment in the organized sector.

4 Conclusion
The larger theoretical and political implications I draw from this alternative framework are quite
different from what Sanyal (2007) emphasizes. Within this alternative framework, post-colonial
capitalism is seen as a unity of capital and non-capital, much as Sanyal (2007) does. While
capital is the domain of the generation of surplus value, as is traditionally emphasized in Marxist
analyses, this alternative framework allows us to also pose the question of the possibility of
surplus extraction from the non-capitalist sector. To our mind, the links of the capitalist and noncapitalist sectors gives rise to the extraction of value by the former from the latter through
unequal exchange. 7 This can happen through monopolistic and monopsonistic markets where
7

Sanyal’s (2007) framework does not accord much importance to the process of unequal exchange. This has both
historical and contemporary significance. For instance, in Sanyal’s conception of mercantile accumulation, an
aspect of the primitive accumulation of capital, merchants buy products from artisans at value (Sanyal, 2007, pp.
113-118). Therefore, merchant capital appropriates a surplus only by selling the product to consumers at prices
above value. This is clearly inadequate. In principle, money can accumulate in the hands of merchants from two
sources: under-paying the artisans and over-charging the consumer, i.e. a transfer of value through unequal
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capitalist and non-capitalist (petty) producers interact. This suggests that the main contradictions
governing post-capitalism are: (a) the contradiction between capital and labour in the capitalist
sector, and (b) the contradiction of the capitalist and the non-capitalist sector as a whole. Hence,
a radical social transformation is possible on the basis of an alliance between workers in the
capitalist sector and all producers (owners and workers) in the non-capitalist sector. 8
Moreover, within this alternative framework, the notion of transition remains meaningful.
Drawing on insights from the early development economics literature, the alternative framework
links the notion of economic development with the idea of structural change, i.e. moving the
workforce from low productivity, low income work in agriculture and the informal nonagricultural sector into high productivity, high income work. Once the idea of economic
development is posed in this way, the most pressing question that calls for investigation is the
reason (or set of reasons) that is preventing rapid structural change. Sanyal (2007) does not
provide a convincing answer to this important question other than asserting that we need to give
up historicist analyses. 9 On the other hand, we suggest that two concrete mechanisms in the form

exchange at both sites of exchange. In the case of India, the first part of this process of dual unequal exchange was
historically very important. From 1757 onwards, the rapacious British East India Company, with its monopoly
position in trade with India, squeezed the artisans across the country through various means (arising from its
monopsonistic position in India), in addition to over-charging consumers in European markets. This process of
unequal exchange was continued in a different form, through the use of tariff and non-tariff policies, after 1857,
when the rule of the British Crown replaced Company Rule. In contemporary capitalism, various linkages between
capital and non-capital can facilitate a net transfer of value from the latter to the former, e.g., sub-contracting. In
fact, that might be one of the reasons for the inability of petty producers (non-capital) to accumulate adequate
amounts of money and expand their production enterprises, not because they are governed by the logic of
production for need.
8
An important implication of this alternative understanding is that the old radical left understanding which sees
the contradiction between feudalism and the broad masses as the fundamental contradiction in India needs to be
rethought. The evidence presented in Basole and Basu (2011a, 2011b) show the decline of feudal forms of
exploitation. Hence a political strategy that bases itself on the understanding that the contradiction between
feudalism and the broad masses is the fundamental contradiction is not reflective of contemporary India reality, a
point that was alluded to in Basu and Das (2013).
9
Sanyal’s (2007) narrative about the evolution of development planning in India is unconvincing as well. He argues
that the initial period of planning, i.e., the period from the early 1950s to the mid- 1960s, can be read as an
attempt by Indian capital, through the Indian State, to carry out primitive accumulation of capital. This narrative
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of vicious cycles that connect small scale agricultural production, informal non-agricultural
employment and high capital intensive production in the formal capital sector are responsible, at
least in part, for slow structural change.
Sanyal’s vision of politics is limited by his theoretical framework. He visualizes postcolonial capitalism as the endless reproduction of the complex unity of capital and non-capital.
He has consciously eschewed any notion of transition. Hence, his politics is also innocent of any
vision of radical structural transformation. All that his critique of capital entails is a slow and
gradual encroachment of the domain of capital by non-capital. While he does not elaborate on
what such encroachment would entail, it is clear that his critique of capital does not extend to a
critique of commodity production. Since non-capital is the domain of petty commodity
production, the limit of the encroachment of capital by non-capital would be the replacement of
capitalist with simple commodity production. While this would eliminate the exploitation of
labour by capital, it would not eliminate commodity fetishism or the instabilities associated with
commodity production. It also hides within itself the possibility of mercantile accumulation and
the resumption of capitalist production. 10

goes against two well known facts about the planning process. First, one of the key motivating ideas in planning
was to absorb surplus labour through rapid industrialization, not add to the pool of surplus labour. Second, even
when there was emphasis on the large scale, capital goods sector, there was explicit protection for the small scale
sector precisely because it was understood as one of the ways to absorb surplus labour. The fact that the
industrialization process could not make any significant dent on the problem of surplus labour should not be read
backwards to claim that the State was attempting to facilitate the primitive accumulation of capital through
planning. In fact, one can explain the failure of the industrialization process in India as arising from a combination
of two crucial facts: (a) an inadequate growth of the home market, which, in turn, was caused by the inability of
the Indian State to carry out land reforms in any meaningful sense (Frenkel, 2009); and (b) an inability of the State
to impose some discipline on the capitalist class through active industrial policy, as was done by the State in South
Korea (Chibber, 2006).
10
Sanyal (2007) sees capital as being governed by accumulation and non-capital by need. Hence, his politics
emphasizes the gradual replacement of the production governed by the logic of accumulation with production
governed by the logic of need. This emphasis on replacing production for profit with production for need is
precisely how socialism has been conceived by its practitioners. Hence, Sanyal’s (2007) politics can be subsumed
within the broader rubric of socialist politics. While socialist politics includes a critique of commodity production,
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